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Abstract 
 
This paper investigates the price effects of environmental certification on commercial real 
estate assets.  It is argued that there are likely to be three main drivers of price differences 
between certified and non-certified buildings.  First, certified buildings offer a bundle of 
benefits to occupiers relating to business productivity, image and occupancy costs.  Second, 
due to these occupier benefits, certified buildings can result in higher rents and lower holding 
costs for investors.  Third, certified buildings may require a lower risk premium.  Drawing 
upon the CoStar database of US commercial real estate assets, hedonic regression analysis is 
used to measure the effect of certification on both rent and price.  We first estimate the rental 
regression for a sample of 110 LEED and 433 Energy Star as well as several thousand 
benchmark buildings to compare the sample to.  The results suggest that, compared to 
buildings in the same metropolitan region, certified buildings have a rental premium and that 
the more highly rated that buildings are in terms of their environmental impact, the greater the 
rental premium.  Furthermore, based on a sample of transaction prices for 292 Energy Star 
and 30 LEED-certified buildings, we find price premia of 10% and 31% respectively 
compared to non-certified buildings in the same metropolitan area.  
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Introduction 
 
 
Given that buildings are estimated to be responsible for 20% of greenhouse gas emissions, 
there is growing awareness within the real estate sector of global warming and the role of the 
real estate in reducing the environmental effects of business (Stern Review, 2007).  Whether a 
purely market-driven approach or mandatory environmental regulations imposed by 
governments and supranational organizations can be expected to be more effective in 
reducing carbon emissions from the building stock is a highly contested issue.  In the real 
estate sector, a blend of mandatory government regulation and voluntary industry standards 
has emerged in response to pressure to reduce the environmental impact of the building stock.  
As a result, required building standards have tended to become more stringent.  Mandatory 
certification has been introduced.  A good example is the introduction of a requirement for 
buildings to publicly display Energy Performance Certificates following the EU Directive on 
the Energy Performance of Buildings in 2003.  However, additionally, the growth of 
environmentalism has lead to the emergence of market-based approaches in the form of a 
range of voluntary, environmental certification systems for buildings such as Green Star 
(Australia), LEED (USA), Energy Star (USA), Green Globes (USA), and BREEAM (UK).   
 
Price signals are central to the operation of markets providing the information basis for the 
allocation of resources.  For market-based solutions to be successful, the key issue has been 
“getting the prices right” i.e. ensuring that prices reflect environmental costs and benefits. 
From the perspective of the real estate investor higher risk-adjusted returns relative to other 
assets would provide a signal to the real estate market to supply more green buildings.  In 
turn, lower risk-adjusted returns provide a signal to supply less.  Although ‘green markets’ 
have expanded dramatically in some sectors of the economy in response to pricing signals, 
there is little empirical evidence that commercial real estate prices are influenced by their 
sustainability characteristics despite widely propagated financial and environmental benefits.  
 
This paper investigates the price differentials between LEED/Energy Star certified buildings 
and non-certified commercial buildings in the US.  Given that the literature suggests that 
certified buildings may offer a bundle of benefits linked to lower operating costs, improved 
employee productivity and image benefits relative to non-certified buildings, we model the 
short and long-run occupational price effects of certification using a static partial equilibrium 
framework.  Assuming that the benefits of certification outweigh the costs, the theoretical 
analysis suggests short-run rental price premium for green buildings due to inward shifts in 
the demand curve for non-certified buildings.  However, in the long-run rental price 
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premiums should reduce as increased market penetration of certified buildings due to 
decreasing marginal production costs will be associated with decreasing marginal utility for 
occupiers.  The asset price effects of certification are modelled and it is suggested that asset 
prices premiums should be obtained due to a combination of higher rental incomes, lower 
holding costs and/or reduced a risk premium.   
 
We measure both the effect of voluntary certification on occupational prices (rents) and on 
asset prices (sales).  In our empirical analysis, the certified buildings are compared to a 
sample of non-certified buildings which were selected to include properties in the same 
metropolitan areas as the certified sample.  For the whole sample, rents and prices are related 
to a set of hedonic characteristics of the buildings such as age, location, number of stories 
inter alia.  Essentially, our hedonic model is measuring price differences between certified 
buildings and randomly selected non-certified buildings in the same metropolitan area 
controlling for differences in age, height, quality, metropolitan etc.  However, the model does 
not control for differences in micro-location.   We first estimate the rental regression for a 
sample of 110 LEED and 433 Energy Star as well as several thousand benchmark buildings.  
The results suggest that certified buildings have a rental premium and that the more highly 
rated that buildings are, the greater the rental premium.  Furthermore, based on a sample of 
transaction prices for 292 Energy Star and 30 LEED-certified buildings, we find price 
premiums of 10% and 31% respectively. It is not established whether the premiums observed 
are due to the benefits of a better image, higher productivity or lower operating costs.  In 
addition, observed premiums may reflect short-run imbalances in supply relative to demand.  
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.  The first section provides background 
discussion to the topic focusing on the growth in environmental certification, the nature of 
green buildings and previous research on their costs and benefits.  This is followed by a 
theoretical analysis of the anticipated price effects of environmental certification for 
commercial real estate assets in both occupier and investment markets.  Thirdly, the main 
empirical section outlines the data and methods used in the study followed by a discussion of 
the results. Finally conclusions are drawn.  
 
 
Background 
 
In the wider economy, the market for eco-friendly products has been expanding in response to 
a willingness-to-pay premium for goods and services which are considered to have reduced 
environmental costs.  This global growth in the market for products with lower environmental 
 5 
costs has stimulated an array of voluntary certification and labeling codes in a range of 
sectors.   Reinforcing this shift is the fact that many certification and labeling codes are 
viewed as contributing to a price-based solution to promote, what is essentially, private 
provision of environmental public goods (Kotchen, 2006).  The LEED Green Building Rating 
System and the Environmental Protection Agency’s Energy Star are two schemes that have 
been developed for the commercial real estate sector in the US.   
 
The LEED Green Building Rating System, developed by the U.S. Green Building Council, 
consists of set of standards for the assessment of environmentally sustainable construction.  
The rates of growth in numbers of 'green' buildings have been rapid with numbers doubling 
nearly every two years. Although the numbers are constantly changing and discussed in more 
detail below, latest data from the CoStar database indicate that there are 326 LEED rated 
buildings and 1027 Energy Star rated commercial buildings.  In common with the major 
regional certification such as Green Star and BREEAM, the rating system focuses on six 
broad categories related to: sustainability of location, water efficiency, energy and 
atmosphere, materials and resources, indoor environmental quality and innovation and design 
process.   
 
There are different levels of LEED accreditation based upon a scoring founded upon the six 
major categories listed above. In LEED v2.2 for new construction and major renovations for 
commercial premises, buildings may qualify for four levels of certification. 
 
• Certified: 26-32 points 
• Silver: 33-38 points 
• Gold: 39-51 points 
• Platinum: 52-69 points 
 
For existing buildings, the Energy Star scheme tends to be more popular. The Energy Star 
scheme involves an assessment of buildings’ energy performance.  Buildings are awarded a 
score out of 100. Only buildings that are in the top quartile are eligible for Energy Star 
accreditation.  Office properties tend to dominate both the LEED and Energy Star in terms of 
space and numbers (Nelson, 2007).  
 
There is a large body of work on the attractions of and case for green buildings.  Most 
empirical studies identify a cost premium associated with LEED rated new buildings and that 
the higher rated buildings tend to have a higher cost premium (see Morrison Hershfield, 
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2005).  However, the cost premium is typically found to be relatively low ranging from 2% to 
10% depending on the level of rating.  In return, a range of benefits are attributed to green 
buildings or associated with features common in green buildings; reduced operating costs, 
improved productivity, improved image for occupiers and owners and reduced operating and 
regulatory risks.  Ex ante, micro-level studies have found that the present value of the reduced 
operating costs alone is sufficient to cover the construction cost premium (see Kats, 2003, 
ECOFYS, 2003).  In turn, surveys of willingness-to-pay have found that occupiers have stated 
that they are prepared to compensate owners for the additional costs of green buildings 
through higher rents (see GVA Grimley, 2007 and McGraw Hill Construction, 2006 for 
examples).  However, the value of such stated preference studies is limited by the ‘cheap talk’ 
problem and there is little empirical evidence to suggest that occupiers and investors pay a 
price premium for certified buildings. 
 
Given the apparent benefits of certified relative to non-certified buildings, there is a clear 
conundrum given the slow rate of adoption. This may be attributed to market failure - when 
allocations resulting from rational agents operating in decentralized markets are sub-optimal.  
This is widely implied in the literature and research to date (for examples, see RICS, 2005; 
Guy, 1998; UNEP, 2007 and Upstream, 2004).  The lack of adoption of sustainable features is 
linked with the lack of an appropriate investment return through the pricing process.  This has 
been explained by imperfect information, split incentives, risk aversion, high discount rates 
and skills shortages inter alia. In addition, there may be other reasons that, despite its 
importance, sustainability may not be reflected in the prices of buildings.  The pricing process 
may be dominated by the weight placed by market participants on a number of overriding 
attributes e.g. location, appearance.  Further, the heterogeneity of real estate may also be 
hindering the measurement of price impacts.    
 
An alternative perspective that must be considered is that there is no market failure and that 
firms are not systematically making non-trivial mistakes in their evaluation of investments in 
environmental beneficial investments.  It has been found that the high discount rates applied 
by businesses to investments in energy saving technologies and investment opportunities are 
not unique to energy (Anderson and Newell, 2004).  Sanstad, Hanemann and Auffhammer 
(2006) point out that many of the barriers identified above are normal features of markets.  
They examine the suggestion that what seems to be evidence of irrational underinvestment 
may therefore reflect measurement error, the omission of relevant costs and other analytical 
failures.   
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Much of the research of the pricing effect of sustainable features in commercial property 
assets has been normative i.e. analyzing what the price effect should be; rather than positive 
i.e. what the price effect actually has been.  Studies have focused on quantifying expected 
price effects of sustainable features in commercial real assets rather than measuring observed 
effects (see Ellison et al, 2007).  In many cases, it is clear that the researchers are frustrated 
and disappointed at the absence of empirical evidence to validate their deductive reasoning on 
price effects (see RICS, 2005).   
 
Additionally, whilst it is indisputable that some attributes of buildings have clear effects on 
their market price, it is not always clear that increased cost due to higher specification leads to 
increased value.  In order to ‘compensate’ for the additional costs of construction of certified 
buildings, rational investors will require a combination of higher income and/or reduced risk.  
In research on the pricing of variations in lease terms, the standard assumption of lease 
pricing models is that real estate investors will extract the same value from the property 
regardless of leases structure (see Grenadier, 1995, Booth and Walsh, 2001, Ambrose, 
Hendershott and Klosek, 2002).  In short, investors are assumed to be fully compensated for 
the costs of providing attributes that occupiers demand.  However, in practice, institutional 
features of the rent determination process may prevent the transmission of expected price 
effects to actual prices.  For instance, researchers have been unable to identify empirically an 
expected term structure of rents (see Bond, Loizou and McAllister, forthcoming, Englund, 
Gunnelin, Hoesli and Söderberg, 2003).   
 
It is clear from the discussion above that real estate investors may be rewarded for the 
additional costs of providing certified buildings in three main ways: higher rents, lower 
holding costs and/or lower risk.  This suggests that failure to observe rental premiums per se 
for certified buildings will not imply market imperfection.  Effects may be identified in either 
the occupier and/or the investment market.  However, assuming a well-functioning market, 
such effects should be observable in capital values and/or transaction prices.  Failure to 
observe price premiums in certified buildings would provide an economic disincentive to real 
estate investors to supply certified buildings given the additional costs of certification.   
 
 
Anticipated Price Effects – Theoretical Considerations 
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Before proceeding to our empirical analysis, we look at the anticipated price effects in more 
depth. We are interested in two prices in commercial real estate markets.  The first is the 
rental price that businesses are prepared to pay to occupy commercial space.  The second is 
the asset price that investors are prepared to pay to receive the rents generated by the 
occupational leases.   
 
The Occupier Market – Rental Pricing 
In order to link the studies on stated preferences of market agents in the real estate market to 
the rental price, we first need to establish the general relationship between willingness-to pay 
(WTP) and observed rental market price. We assume that consumers i.e. occupiers will 
express their preference for certified buildings as a willingness-to-pay (WTP) in excess of the 
price of non-certified buildings. The relationship between individual WTP functions and the 
aggregate market price is not straightforward, however, since the total benefit received may 
be higher than the market price for some consumers.  As Figure 1 shows, some consumers 
may be willing to pay above market prices (for example P1 and P2) to obtain the certified 
product. The excess utility derived from the difference between the observed market price and 
the hypothetical WTP is a consumer surplus.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Demand curve for building certification with heterogeneous benefits  
NOTE: This figure illustrates the composition of the WTP function with a positive consumer surplus (area labeled 
CS) in relation to the equilibrium price (P*).  
 
Total WTP is thus defined as market price (P*) plus consumer surplus (CS). Since there is a 
single market price, it will only partially reflect the total WTP of all market participants. The 
CS depends on individual cost saving profiles and the importance of following corporate 
P** 
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sustainability guidelines to a company and its customers as this is expected to generate 
additional revenues. The difference between WTP and observed price is crucial for 
understanding the seemingly paradoxical fact that observed price premia may in fact be lower 
than the combined utility of cost savings, image benefits, productivity enhancements etc.  The 
magnitude of the consumer surplus is also a function of market penetration of certified 
buildings, which are discussed in more detail below.  
 
To demonstrate that the diverse price effects of providing environmental certification for a 
product, we model the short-run price effects of certification using a static partial equilibrium 
framework in the next step (see Sedjo and Swallow, 2002).  Whether certified products will 
actually incur a price premium depends on a number of factors such as the presence and size 
of a group of eco-consumers, their utility function relative to that of all consumers and the 
level of the additional costs of certification.  The key issue is that when certification is 
introduced, supply and demand functions will differ for certified and non-certified buildings.   
 
In Figure 2, the rental supply and demand curves for space are plotted starting with a situation 
where no certification is initially available.  As the market clears, QO is supplied and P0 is the 
equilibrium price. When (compulsory or voluntary) certification is introduced, it is assumed 
to generate new demand and supply curves.  Assuming increased costs associated with 
certification, supply becomes more inelastic as developers require increased prices to offset 
these costs (SC0 → SCcb).  In addition, the demand curve for certified buildings is assumed to 
shift outwards as occupiers are prepared to pay more for certified products (DC0 → DCcb). 
The marginal willingness to pay a premium by eco-consumers diminishes however. This 
means that when large quantities are consumed at a low price the premium evaporates as 
illustrated by the converging demand curves.  The corollary of this is that the proportion of 
the premium is likely to be higher in the Class A segment of the market and – somewhat 
counter-intuitively - that suppliers increase the premium by raising costs and restricting 
supply.  
 
A new equilibrium price and quantity are produced (Qcb, Pcb) generating higher prices for 
certified buildings.  Manifestly, the key variables are the additional costs associated with 
certification and the willingness of occupiers to pay an additional sum for certified buildings.  
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Figure 2: Short-run effect of introducing certification into the market 
NOTE: This figure shows the shift in aggregate demand and supply curves caused by the introduction of 
environmental certification standards into the real estate market. Since certification increases production costs, 
supply becomes more inelastic (SC0 → SCcb).  The demand curve for certified buildings shifts outwards to reflect 
increased WTP for certified products (DC0 → DCcb). Thus, new partial equilibrium quantities and prices are 
established (Qcb, Pcb).  
 
Expanding this analysis further to show differential price effects on both certified and non-
certified buildings, Figure 3 assumes an inward shift in the demand curve for non-certified 
buildings (Dncb).  With the introduction of certification, it is expected that occupiers will be 
prepared to pay less per unit of supply of non-certified buildings at the aggregate level 
reflecting a generally decreased WTP in the presence of a superior product. Supply of non-
certified space is more elastic (Sncb), however, since it is comparatively less costly and time-
consuming to provide space in this segment. In the short run, we therefore expect that 
certified space achieves higher rents (Pcb >Pncb ) but a larger quantity supplied in the non-
certified market segment (Qncb >Qcb ).  
 
In the medium- and long-run, a different pattern is likely to emerge (Figure 4). Under the 
assumption that certified products become the norm their supply function will coincide with 
that of non-certified, eventually yielding a single supply curve (Scb,ncb).  Differences in 
demand for both types of products will persist, however. In fact, the discount on non-certified 
space is expected to increase further as certified space becomes more widespread. Regardless 
of this, the price premium on certified space will erode over time, mainly because of the 
change in the supply function. A further consequence of this is that the relationship between 
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quantities supplied in each segment will reverse as the marginal cost of certification decreases 
(Qcb >Qncb ). 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Short-run equilibrium prices for certified and non-certified market segments 
NOTE: The demand curve for non-certified buildings (Dncb) shifts further inward as certified buildings achieve 
higher market penetration rates. Supply of non-certified space becomes more elastic (Sncb). In equilibrium, certified 
space achieves both higher rents (Pcb >Pncb ) while a larger quantity is supplied in the non-certified market segment 
(Qncb >Qcb ). 
 
An important caveat is in order, however. The extent of the change is conditional upon the 
extent to which certified buildings become a commonly accepted industry standard.  If 
certified buildings are only considered a niche market and fail to grow considerably, a 
different outcome may be expected. Instead, the short-run situation illustrated in Figure 3 may 
persist as eco-consumers with a higher WTP pay a premium to occupy certified space in the 
niche segment.  
 
Dynamic pricing aspects 
The previous section has identified possible market outcomes under various constellations in 
the framework of a static partial equilibrium analysis.  We now explore the dynamic aspects 
of market entry and diffusion pertaining to price effects in more depth, by outlining an 
approach that merges product life cycle (PLC) theory with environmental equilibrium 
analysis.  
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As stated above, economies of scale in building production will tend to emerge in the medium 
term.  A common assumption is that certification increases construction costs, at least 
initially. It is further assumed that complying with certification standards requires additional 
know-how and resources which specialized service providers in the construction and 
consulting industries possess and seek to exploit.  This comparably more advanced production 
technology is expected to command a price premium that varies depending on the market 
share and phase in the product life cycle. 
 
 
Figure 4: Medium to long-run equilibrium prices for certified and non-certified market 
segments 
NOTE: The supply functions of certified and non-certified products converges, eventually yielding a single supply 
curve (Scb,ncb).  As certified space becomes more widespread, the absolute levels of the price premium will erode 
mainly because of the change in the supply function and the quantities supplied in each segment will reverse as the 
marginal cost of certification decreases (Qcb >Qncb). 
 
Figure 5 shows the dynamic interaction of the marginal cost function (mc) with the marginal 
utility (mu) of certified buildings.  In this context, marginal utility is composed of operational 
cost savings associated with implementing energy-efficient standards and practices (csv) and 
the additional image-productivity premium (ip) paid by consumers (occupiers) to rent 
certified space so that  
 
           (1) 
 
dxcsvipfmu ∫=
1
0
),(
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While we assume the marginal csv to remain constant, the ip that initially arose due to product 
differentiation benefits will diminish over time.  In the initial phase, costs outweigh the 
tangible and intangible savings as producers seek to recoup development and introduction 
costs. At this point, the production capacity of certified buildings is low because of the low 
degree of standardization. As the market share of certified buildings increases (by voluntary 
or compulsory certification or a combination of both as outlined in the previous section), 
certification costs decrease gradually and production costs will reduce due to increasing 
returns to scale in the production process of certifiable buildings. BE 1 denotes the break-even 
point where mc=csv.  Moving along the mc line, investment in building certification is 
justified in the area between BE 1 and BE 2 by the combination of cost savings and image 
gains due to being perceived as eco-friendly and in compliance with internal or external 
environmental policies although energy cost savings alone outweigh the additional cost. In the 
rental market, it is expected that cost savings positively impact the WTP of occupiers since 
their total occupancy cost is ceteris paribus decreasing with certification. A consumer surplus 
arises as defined above with  
 
(2) 
 
As the cost of certification declines further with increasing market penetration, the consumer 
surplus increases and investment in certification is feasible even in the absence of an image 
premium simply due to cost savings. As certified buildings become the norm in the market, 
production constraints and the higher marginal cost of certifying buildings with low 
environmental performance may cause the mc to increase again, eventually exceeding both 
csv and mu. BE3 marks the transition from the feasible certification space to a situation where 
the cost of investing in the certification of the nth building outweighs mu. In essence, as 
market penetration grows rental premiums should decrease as shown before in Figure 4.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
dxcfcsvipCS ∫∫ −=
1
0
1
0
)(),(
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Figure 5: Marginal utility and marginal cost as a function of market penetration of the certified 
product 
 
NOTE: .This figure depicts the dynamic interaction of the marginal cost function (mc) with the marginal utility 
(mu) of certified buildings. Hence, mu is composed of operational cost savings (csv) and the additional image and 
productivity premium (ip) paid by consumers (occupiers) to rent certified space. BE 1,2 and 3 denote the break-
even points of mc and mu.  
 
 
 
Asset Pricing 
 
Potential price effects of sustainable features in certified buildings can be transmitted to asset 
prices through a number of channels.  In standard real estate appraisal models, asset value 
represents the discounted sum all future net incomes.  Assuming constant growth, the value 
(V) can be expressed as 
 
          (3) 
 
where V is the current value, R
t 
is rent, C
t 
is the periodic costs of owning the unit, 
management, vacancy, refurbishment etc (so that R
t
 – C
t
 = Net Operating Income), g is a 
mu 
∑
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constant growth rate, i is the target rate of return (composed of the risk-free rate of return plus 
a risk premium), and t is the life of the asset. When taken as a perpetuity, this approximates to 
 
      (4) 
 
where i – g is a capitalization rate.  As indicated above, the attributes of green buildings have 
the potential to affect many of the variables in the appraisal model: 
 
R
t
  Assuming a well-functioning market and that the positive attributes outweigh negative 
attributes associated with certified buildings, occupiers should be willing to pay higher rents 
due to expected lower total occupancy costs and the benefits to occupiers of improved image 
and business performance.   
 
C
t 
  It is also expected that the increased attractiveness to occupiers should reduce the costs of 
ownership due to reduced vacancies and potentially reduced capital expenditure.   
 
i – g  The risk premium (and, therefore, capitalization rate) may also be affected.  Whilst 
speculative, it has been claimed that the reductions in regulatory risk associated with certified 
buildings feature and the (implied) reductions in uncertainty of income may mean that 
investors apply a lower risk premium.  However, on the other hand, there is the possibility 
that the less established technologies associated with green buildings may attract 
counteracting increases in risk premium.  
 
 
Actual Price Effects – Empirical Research 
 
 
There have been few studies have attempted to measure the price effects of green building 
rating.  Studies that have identified higher rents and improved returns based on the views and 
experiences of expert professions still require empirical verification. Whilst recognizing the 
centrality of pricing to adoption, recent reviews of the literature have found little convincing 
research that identified a certification premium (see Berry, 2007).  Nelson (2007) examined 
the performance differences between certified and non-certified buildings using a number of 
criteria.  Drawing upon the CoStar database, the study compared LEED rated buildings and 
Energy Star buildings with a vastly larger sample of non-certified buildings in the CoStar 
database. Whilst acknowledging the significant differences between the sample and the wider 
gi
NOIV
−
=
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population, it found that certified buildings tended to be newer, owner-occupied or single 
tenanted, concentrated geographically and sectorally (in the office sector).  Recognizing that 
it did not control for these differences, the study identified lower vacancy rates and higher 
rents in LEED-rated buildings.  These broad results have been confirmed by Miller, Spivey 
and Florance (2008) and Eichholtz, Kok and Quigley (2008). Both of these studies also drew 
upon the CoStar database to identify the effect of environmental certification on sale prices 
and rents respectively. To control for differences between their sample of certified buildings 
(927 buildings) and a much larger sample of non-certified buildings, Miller et al include a 
number of control variables such as size, location and age in their hedonic regression 
framework. They find that dummy variables for Energy Star and LEED ratings show the 
expected positive sign but tests show that these results are not significant at the 10 percent 
level. Eichholtz et al use a similar hedonic framework to test for the effect of certification on 
the contract rents of 694 office buildings.  Using GIS techniques, they identify other office 
buildings in the CoStar database within a radius of 0.25 miles of each certified building. They 
identify a rent premium on the contract rents per square foot of 2.8 % for Energy Star and 
0.3% for LEED-certified buildings. However, when they adjusted the rents to reflect lower 
vacancy rates in certified buildings the premium increases to 8.9% and 4.4% for Energy Star 
and LEED-certified buildings respectively. The results for LEED-certified buildings have to 
be interpreted with caution, however, as they fail to be significant at the 10% level. 
 
 Whilst there are clearly plausible a priori reasons to expect price differences between 
certified and non-certified buildings, this is not necessarily certain.  As noted below, previous 
research has shown that not all variations in asset attributes are necessarily reflected in asset 
prices (see, for example, Wheaton, 1984 below).   
   
 
 
The Empirical Model 
 
Rent determination is central to the revelation of WTP by occupiers.  There is a long 
established literature on the determinants of office rents that investigates the effect on rental 
levels of locational, physical and lease characteristics of commercial property assets.  Rosen 
(1974) first used the hedonic pricing framework commonly used in rental determination 
research. He generalized that the hedonic price function covering any good or service 
consisted of a variety of utility-bearing characteristics. In office rent determination literature, 
the use of hedonic modeling typically involves the use that structural, locational and lease 
characteristics be used as the independent variables determining value.   
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Hedonic analysis 
 
Hedonic regression modeling is the standard methodology for examining price determinants 
in real estate research. We use this method in our study primarily to isolate the effect of 
LEED and Energy Star certification. As described in the literature review section of this 
paper, higher rents or transaction prices may simply be due to the fact that certified buildings 
are newer, higher or located in more attractive locations or markets.  The quintessential log-
linear hedonic rent model takes the following form:  
 
iiiii ZxR εφβα +++=ln         (1) 
 
Where Ri is the natural log of average rent per square foot in a given building, xi is a vector of 
the natural log of several explanatory locational and physical characteristics1, β  and φ  are the 
respective vectors of parameters to be estimated. Zi is a vector of time-related variables and iε  
is a random error and stochastic disturbance term that is expected to take the form of a normal 
distribution with a mean of zero and a variance of σ e2. The hedonic weights assigned to each 
variable are equivalent to this characteristic’s overall contribution to the rental price (Rosen 
1974).  
 
For the purpose of this study, we specify two hedonic models. The first model explains rents 
and the second explains price per square foot in sales transactions.  
 
 
 
Rent Model 
 
(2) 
 
 
In this model, Yi represents the year of construction or major refurbishment (whichever 
occurred more recently), Oi is the occupancy rate of the property, Si is the number of stories 
of the property, Li  is the land area, Fi is the size of a typical floor in the building and εi is the 
                                               
1
 We acknowledge the body of literature on the rental effects of age, vacancy levels, size and number of 
stories (for vacancy rates see Sirmans, Sirmans and Benjamin, 1989; Sirmans and Guidry, 1993; Clapp, 
1993; Mills, 1992; for floor area see Clapp, 1980; Gat, 1998; Bollinger, Ihlanfeldt and Bowes, 1998;  
for age see Bollinger, Ihlanfeldt and Bowes, 1998; Slade, 2000, Dunse et al, 2003; for height see 
Shilton and Zaccaria, 1994).   However, we do not discuss this body of work in this context. 
itiiiiiii GRFLSOYR εββββββ +++++++= lnlnlnlnlnln 543210
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error term which is assumed to be normally distributed with constant variance and a mean of 
zero. A rent premium for LEED and/or Energy Star rated buildings is captured by the GRi 
term, a dichotomous variable that takes the value of 1 for certified buildings and a value of 0 
otherwise.  
 
Similarly, the regression for estimating price per square foot in sales transactions is estimated 
in the following way:  
 
Transaction Price Model: 
(3) 
 
 
where YSi is the year of the sales transaction and Wi is a vector of proxy variables of 
unobserved locational traits (e.g. x and y coordinates). All other variables are the same as in 
Rent Model.  
 
To detect differences in the weight of parameter estimates across markets, the intercept β0 is 
estimated separately for each market. This Least Squares Dummy Variable (LSDV) approach 
is used to control for unobserved traits across metropolitan markets. The LSDV allows 
intercepts of the regression to differ across markets while assuming constant variable 
coefficients. This is important not only because of the difference in price levels across 
markets but also because it controls for tax and other incentives that several states and cities 
grant for buildings that are certified including tax credits, reduced permitting fees and 
property tax abatements (Roberts, 2007).  
 
Data 
In the environmental valuation research, different methodological approaches have been taken 
to the estimation of WTP.  This study attempts to measure the revealed preferences of market 
participants.  Garrod and Willis (1999) evaluate the relative advantages and disadvantages 
stated versus revealed preference methods used in environmental valuation studies.  A key 
issue is the existence and quality of the market data.  In order to estimate revealed 
preferences, this study draws on CoStar's comprehensive national database which includes 
approximately 42.9 billion square feet of commercial space in 2 million properties making it 
the largest available real estate database in the United States. In an effort to provide details on 
the environmental performance of buildings, the CoStar Group began tagging LEED and 
Energy Star buildings about two years ago in collaboration with the US Green Building 
itiiiiiiii WFLSOYYSP εββββββββ ++++++++= lnlnlnlnlnlnlnln 76543210
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Council (USGBC) and the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).  This enables 
researchers to identify numbers and types of LEED and Energy Star certified buildings in the 
database. For the purpose of a rigorous analysis of certified buildings, a key issue is the 
benchmark against which the sample of certified buildings can be compared. There are 
currently 326 LEED-certified and 1027 Energy Star certified office and retail properties in the 
database. Our benchmark sample consists of 3626 commercial buildings in 60 metropolitan 
markets spread throughout the United States.  Only metropolitan markets that contain 
certified buildings have been selected.  This means that our hedonic model is measuring price 
differences between certified buildings and randomly selected non-certified buildings in the 
same metropolitan area controlling for differences in age, height, quality, metropolitan etc.  
However, it does not control for differences in micro-location.    
 
In the first step, we drew details of 543 certified buildings with complete information of 
which 110 were LEED-NC certified and 433 were Energy Star certified representing 194 
million square feet of commercial space. Weighted by the size of the properties, the four 
largest markets in our sample containing both LEED and Energy Star buildings were Houston 
(14%), Los Angeles (12%), Chicago (9%) and Denver (6%). Considering only the subsample 
of LEED certified buildings, the largest markets are Chicago (20%), New York City (10%), 
Seattle/Puget Sound (7%) and Washington DC (7%). In the second step, buildings were 
selected in the same metropolitan areas as the certified sample.  Although the market 
weightings may be different between the benchmark and the certified samples, our regression 
model controls for market-specific effects. Both the certified and the benchmark samples 
include retail and office buildings with the former making up roughly 20% of the benchmark 
and 15% of the certified sample. Since this corresponds to less than 20 observations of 
certified retail properties, we will refrain from analyzing retail properties separately from 
office buildings. A preliminary analysis of retail property suggests, however, that the results 
resemble those of the combined analysis to a certain extent.  Of the LEED buildings, 24% 
(n=26) are certification-level, 36% (n=39) are Silver, 36% (n=40) are Gold and 4% (n=5) are 
Platinum level. It is clear that the Platinum sample is too small to draw any inferences about 
pricing differences based on level of certification. In total, we have used 3,257 observations 
of transaction prices and 3,626 (asking) rent observations.  
 
Results  
 
Descriptive Statistics 
The descriptive statistics are displayed in Table 1.  There are clearly some differences 
between certified and non-certified buildings.  The former tend to be newer.  In particular, the 
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median con of LEED certified buildings is 2005.  The comparable figure for the benchmark 
sample is 1988.  Whilst there is little difference between buildings with Energy Star 
certification and the benchmark sample in terms of age, the former tend to be dominated by 
tall buildings suggesting that they are mainly located in downtown locations.  This is 
supported by the fact that Energy Star buildings tend to have the lowest land area.  Without 
controlling for the differences between the samples, certified buildings have the higher mean 
asking rents and lower vacancy rates than non-certified buildings. 
 
 
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of overall sample with LEED and Energy Star sample 
 
Overall RENT  
$ psf 
PRICE 
 $ psf 
% LEASED LAND AREA 
(acres) 
STORIES YEAR 
TOTAL 
Mean 24.68 285.44 71.79 6.94 5.54 1985 
Median 22.50 205.00 86.06 1.86 2.00 1988 
Std. Dev. 12.59 248.73 33.21 85.64 8.34 20.09 
Skewness 3.60 1.89 -1.21 59.85 3.46 -1.98 
Kurtosis 37.46 6.80 3.10 3.70 19.36 8.04 
Observations 3626 3257 3626 3626 3626 3626 
       
LEED RENT  
$ psf 
PRICE  
$ psf 
% LEASED LAND AREA 
(acres) 
 
STORIES YEAR 
TOTAL 
Mean 27.07 318.38 73.78 15.36 10.57 1997 
Median 24.50 312.68 88.40 1.91 6.00 2005 
Std. Dev. 11.62 174.35 32.47 68.57 12.29 19.41 
Skewness 0.96 0.42 -1.26 7.96 2.01 -3.57 
Kurtosis 4.53 2.53 3.31 67.84 6.55 16.18 
Observations 110 30 110 110 110 110 
       
Energy Star RENT  
$ psf 
PRICE  
$ psf 
% LEASED LAND AREA 
(acres) 
 
STORIES YEAR 
TOTAL 
Mean 29.34 346.11 88.40 4.87 18.08 1989 
Median 25.50 263.07 92.08 2.36 13.00 1989 
Std. Dev. 18.53 243.44 13.15 6.67 14.71 11.27 
Skewness 5.48 1.32 -3.01 3.53 1.17 -1.91 
Kurtosis 47.32 4.15 17.47 22.72 4.09 11.09 
Observations 433 288 433 433 433 433 
NOTE: Descriptive statistics of the samples used in this analysis (LEED-certified, Energy Star and all buildings). 
The values indicate considerable differences among the groups in the distribution of occupancy rates, land area, 
height and vintage that need to be controlled in the regression analysis.  
 
Aggregate time series sample   
In the first step, aggregate time series data of the full set of 350 LEED and 1015 Energy Star 
buildings was analyzed. Figure 5 illustrates that all types of certified buildings exhibit lower 
vacancy rates than the benchmark group of Class A and Class B office buildings. It is 
interesting to note that the vacancy rates of certified buildings exhibit an overall decreasing 
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trend in recent periods while the benchmark group, particularly the Class B type vacancy rate 
is increasing. Roughly half of the LEED sample buildings and 80% of the Energy Star sample 
are Class A properties.   
 
Turning to Figure 6, we note that the average nominal rental rate per square foot is 
consistently higher for LEED Silver and Gold certified properties compared to their overall 
Class A and B peers. This may be taken as a further indication of the enhanced attractiveness 
of certified buildings. 
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Figure 5:  Average Rents: Certified and Non-Certified Buildings Compared 
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Figure 6:  Average Vacancy Rates: Certified and Non-Certified Buildings Compared 
NOTE:  Plots showing average quarterly rental rates and vacancy rates from Q4 200 until Q1 2008. Compared to 
average Class A and Class B office buildings, LEED and Energy Star certified buildings exhibit lower vacancy 
rates and overall higher rental rates (with some exceptions). 
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Hedonic regression results and the rent premium 
 
Having analyzed the aggregate sample of certified buildings, we now turn to the results 
derived from the smaller cross-sectional sample described in the data section. To further 
investigate the hypothesis of a rent and price premium for certified buildings, we estimate 
hedonic regressions as outlined above.  
 
Two separate regressions are estimated to model rent and transaction price separately. All 
continuous numeric variables were transformed to log values to (1) reduce non-normality 
found in initial examinations of the dataset, (2) to reduce heteroskedasticity and (3) to be able 
to interpret the results as elasticities. Appendix 1 shows the results of the estimation of the 
rent model. When controlling for the most important rent determinants such as age, 
occupancy rate, height, size and location, we still find a significant rent premium of 11.8% in 
LEED/Energy Star-certified buildings compared to non-certified peers. All the control 
variables used in the regression show the expected signs although not all of them reach the 
desired significance levels. This regression explains roughly 55% of the cross-sectional 
variation in rents in the entire sample. 
 
The White test displayed at the bottom of the results reveals evidence of significant 
heteroskedasticity in the data. While the estimators can be expected to remain unbiased 
despite the presence of heteroskedasticity, the t-statistics and significance levels have to be 
interpreted with caution as they may be inflated.  The appendix reports White 
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors and covariance to adjust for this violation of 
OLS assumptions. A further validity test is the Ramsey Reset test for omitted variables, 
misspecification and existence of non-linearities.  The reported values show that the 
hypothesis of a faulty functional form is rejected at the 1% level but not at the 5% level.  
 
Since we are primarily interested in the impact of environmental certification, we investigate 
the coefficient of the certified building variable further by using a Wald test. Under the null 
hypothesis of this test, the coefficient of green certification is zero. If we are able to reject the 
hypothesis at the 5 percent level, we can interpret this as evidence of a premium. The results 
reported in the appendix show that the existence of a "green" rent premium is confirmed at the 
5% level.  
 
Appendix 2 shows a re-estimation of the regression with separate dichotomous variables for 
LEED and Energy Star certification. Both types of certification are found to exert a positive 
and significant impact on rents. It also becomes evident that the largest part of the rent 
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premium of certified buildings is generated by Energy Star buildings when controlling for 
other factors. One possible explanation for this disproportionate weight of Energy Star in the 
premium is that LEED buildings are on average relatively new buildings so a large part of the 
observed premium without the controls may in fact be explained by the characteristics of the 
buildings (age, occupancy etc.) whereas this may not necessarily be the case for Energy Star 
buildings. It is also important to keep in mind that the Energy Star sample we used is much 
larger than the LEED sample which may also affect the results.  
 
A further common assumption that we set out to test is that the rent premium of LEED 
buildings is increasing with the level of certification. Appendix 3 reports the estimation 
results with a LEED level variable. In this specification, the dichotomous LEED variable is 
modified to reflect the certification standard, i.e. Certified=1, Silver=2, Gold=3, and 
Platinum=4. Whilst acknowledging the small number of platinum rated buildings, the linear 
coefficient indicates an average 3% increase in rent for each increase in certification level.  
 
Hedonic regression results and the transaction price premium 
Based on the considerations of the first part of this paper, we expect to detect a premium not 
only for rents but also for transaction prices of certified buildings.  To test this hypothesis, we 
re-estimate the regression with transaction price per square foot as the dependent variable. 
Appendix 4 reports the results of the estimation. The functional form of the price regression 
differs slightly from the rental equation since it also includes the year of the transaction as an 
important control variable.  Similar to our findings for rents, we identify a general 
certification premium of 11.4%. The diagnostic tests displayed at the bottom of the results 
reveal again the presence of heteroskedasticity in the residuals but the Ramsey test does not 
reach the critical significance threshold. Although this potentially merits further investigation, 
we assume that the model is sufficiently robust for addressing the research question at hand.  
 
Appendix 5 reports the details of type of certification and its impact on the sale price of a 
property. Both LEED and Energy Star certification are found to be significant at the 5% level 
indicating a positive and significant impact on price per square foot. The coefficients suggest 
a 31% price premium for LEED buildings and a 10% premium for Energy Star.  Although 
high for the LEED buildings, these premiums are consistent with previously published results 
and the mean and median values observed for the data set.  They may be indicative of a ‘hot’ 
market generated by the expansion of ‘green funds’ in commercial real estate.  
 
Conclusion and Future Work 
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Growing global concern about climate change is increasingly transforming the preferences of 
consumers and investors.  In addition, throughout the regulatory hierarchy, international, 
national and local institutions are expanding the scope of environmental regulation affecting 
commercial real estate assets.  Similar to other product markets, a voluntary environmental 
certification system for new buildings and refurbishments has emerged in most mature real 
estate markets.  Despite the publicity and promotion, the voluntarily certified sector is 
miniscule in terms of the current total commercial real estate stock.  However, it is likely that 
certified green buildings will become progressively more important. 
 
Price signals are fundamental to the supply of green buildings.  Whilst surveys of the real 
estate occupiers suggest that they are prepared to pay more for green certified assets, there has 
been little evidence to support their assertions.  Further, a priori inference suggests that 
certified buildings should obtain a rental and an asset price premium.  The rental price 
premium is expected to be largely determined by the level of demand from occupiers for 
certified buildings.  This, in turn, will be a function of the extent of the consumer surplus 
generated by certified buildings.  In addition, the increased costs associated with production 
of certified buildings will affect the price premium.  The supply response is also significant 
and price premiums should change over time linked to changes in marginal production costs 
and the extent of market penetration.   
 
From the asset price perspective, it is expected that investors’ holding costs should be lower 
due to attractiveness to occupiers associated with business performance, image and lower 
running costs.  This can lead to a rental premium and/or lower vacancy rates.  In turn, 
investors in certified buildings are likely to be ‘future proof’ from potential increasing 
regulatory requirements.   The lower risks due to reduced voids and lower regulatory risks 
may reduce the risk premium that investors require from certified real estate assets relative to 
non-certified real estate assets.   
 
To date, the relatively small numbers of certified buildings and the fact that they tend to be 
built for the public sector or for owner-occupation has hindered empirical investigation of the 
price impacts of certification. Drawing upon the CoStar Group’s database, our study provides 
preliminary support for the price premium hypothesis.  The uncontrolled sample suggest the 
results suggest that certified green buildings obtain higher rents, have lower vacancy rates and 
sell for more than non-certified buildings.  When we control for potential differences between 
certified buildings and non-certified buildings, the finding of price premium relative to 
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buildings in the same metropolitan area is confirmed. In addition, there is evidence to suggest 
that the more highly rated that buildings are, the greater the premium.   
 
However, we cannot be sure that the price premiums themselves are sustainable.  The finding 
of high levels of price premiums may be indicative of short-term demand pressure effects 
from both occupiers and investors in the context of an under-supplied market.  As the market 
for certified buildings matures, it will be necessary to disentangle the short-run and long-run 
dynamics of the pricing process.  Further, it would be interesting to investigate the extent to 
which observed premiums can be attributed to the benefits of a better image, higher 
productivity or lower operating costs.  This attribution is likely to vary temporally and 
spatially as the relative importance of energy costs fluctuates along with social and business 
expectations. 
 
Although the results are plausible and fit with expectations, this is a study of a fairly 
embryonic sector.  An predictable caveat is that the sample needs to be larger.  For instance, 
we identified rent or transaction price information for only four LEED Platinum buildings.  
Further work is needed on model specification because of the presence of heteroskedasticity 
in the residuals which potentially distorts significance levels. Initial tests using an alternative 
Weighted-Least-Squares regression model showed similar results.  There is clearly scope for 
more empirical research in these areas as more data becomes available. It would also be 
desirable to analyze the premia of various property types, most notably of retail property 
contingent on a larger sample of this property type.   
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Appendix 1  
 
Specification and results of rent regression and the impact of certification (in dollars per sq.ft.) 
 
Dependent Variable: LOG(RENT) 
 
Method: Least Squares   
Included observations: 2613   
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
GREEN 0.118 0.02 5.58 0.00 
LOG(YEAR BUILT) 0.382 0.02 19.26 0.00 
LOG(PERCENT LEASED) 0.020 0.01 1.73 0.08 
LOG(STORIES) 0.110 0.01 14.21 0.00 
LOG(LAND AREA) -0.015 0.01 -2.09 0.04 
LOG(TYPICAL FLOOR) -0.010 0.01 -0.91 0.36 
MARKET=ATLANTA -0.087 0.11 -0.79 0.43 
MARKET=AUSTIN -0.026 0.11 -0.24 0.81 
MARKET=BALTIMORE 0.183 0.10 1.75 0.08 
MARKET=BOSTON 0.181 0.11 1.58 0.11 
MARKET=CHARLOTTE -0.103 0.11 -0.94 0.35 
MARKET=CHICAGO -0.142 0.11 -1.29 0.20 
MARKET=CINCINNATI/DAYTON -0.548 0.12 -4.40 0.00 
MARKET=CLEVELAND -0.451 0.11 -3.99 0.00 
MARKET=COLORADO SPRINGS -0.480 0.11 -4.25 0.00 
MARKET=COLUMBUS -0.466 0.11 -4.12 0.00 
MARKET=DALLAS/FT WORTH -0.232 0.11 -2.15 0.03 
MARKET=DENVER -0.253 0.11 -2.33 0.02 
MARKET=DETROIT -0.309 0.14 -2.25 0.02 
MARKET=EAST BAY/OAKLAND 0.117 0.11 1.05 0.29 
MARKET=HARTFORD -0.082 0.11 -0.74 0.46 
MARKET=HAWAII -0.305 0.15 -2.01 0.04 
MARKET=HOUSTON -0.237 0.11 -2.19 0.03 
MARKET=INDIANAPOLIS 0.025 0.11 0.23 0.82 
MARKET=INLAND EMPIRE  0.059 0.12 0.50 0.61 
MARKET=JACKSONVILLE (FLORIDA) -0.240 0.11 -2.12 0.03 
MARKET=KANSAS CITY -0.448 0.13 -3.51 0.00 
MARKET=LAS VEGAS 0.443 0.10 4.24 0.00 
MARKET=LONG ISLAND (NEW YORK) 0.511 0.10 4.89 0.00 
MARKET=LOS ANGELES 0.392 0.11 3.66 0.00 
MARKET=LOUISVILLE -0.478 0.10 -4.57 0.00 
MARKET=MILWAUKEE/MADISON -0.434 0.12 -3.55 0.00 
MARKET=MINNEAPOLIS/ST PAUL -0.698 0.13 -5.55 0.00 
MARKET=NASHVILLE -0.409 0.10 -3.91 0.00 
MARKET=NEW ORLEANS -0.429 0.11 -4.09 0.00 
MARKET=NEW YORK CITY 0.717 0.12 6.17 0.00 
MARKET=NORTHERN NEW JERSEY 0.193 0.11 1.72 0.09 
MARKET=ORANGE (CALIFORNIA) 0.248 0.11 2.32 0.02 
MARKET=ORLANDO 0.056 0.11 0.51 0.61 
MARKET=PHILADELPHIA -0.116 0.11 -1.03 0.30 
MARKET=PHOENIX 0.193 0.11 1.77 0.08 
MARKET=PORTLAND -0.094 0.11 -0.84 0.40 
MARKET=RICHMOND VA 0.460 0.10 4.39 0.00 
 30 
MARKET=ROANOKE 0.236 0.11 2.25 0.02 
MARKET=SACRAMENTO 0.259 0.11 2.32 0.02 
MARKET=SALT LAKE CITY -0.210 0.22 -0.97 0.33 
MARKET=SAN DIEGO 0.402 0.11 3.67 0.00 
MARKET=SAN FRANCISCO 0.397 0.11 3.58 0.00 
MARKET=SAVANNAH 0.573 0.11 5.42 0.00 
MARKET=SEATTLE/PUGET SOUND 0.129 0.11 1.17 0.24 
MARKET=SOUTH BAY/SAN JOSE 0.368 0.11 3.35 0.00 
MARKET=SOUTH FLORIDA 0.146 0.11 1.33 0.18 
MARKET=SPOKANE -1.013 0.11 -9.61 0.00 
MARKET=ST. LOUIS -0.197 0.14 -1.45 0.15 
MARKET=TAMPA/ST PETERSBURG -0.069 0.13 -0.52 0.60 
MARKET=WASHINGTON DC 0.343 0.11 3.18 0.00 
MARKET=WESTCHESTER -0.383 0.22 -1.78 0.08 
     
R-squared 0.55 Mean dep var 3.13 
Adjusted R-squared 0.54 S.D. dep var 0.45 
S.E. of regression 0.30 AIC 0.47 
Sum squared resid 235.08 Schwarz criterion 0.60 
Log likelihood -561.20 DW-stat 1.52 
 
 
 
     
Ramsey RESET Test: 
  
F-statistic 7.96 Prob. F(1,2546) 0.00 
Log likelihood ratio 8.14 Prob. Chi-Square(1) 0.00 
 
Wald Test: 
  
Equation: EQ_RENT_GREEN  
    
Test Statistic Value df Probability 
F-statistic 31.09 (1, 2556) 0.00 
Chi-square 31.09 1 0.00 
    
Normalized Restriction (= 0) Value Std. Err. 
    
C(1) (GREEN) 0.186 0.02 
    
     
Ramsey RESET Test: 
  
F-statistic 7.96 Prob. F(1,2546) 0.00 
Log likelihood ratio 8.14 Prob. Chi-Square(1) 0.00 
 
 
White Heteroskedasticity Test: 
    
F-statistic 3.35 Prob. F(61,2551) 0.00 
Obs*R-squared 193.73 Prob. Chi-Square(61) 0.00 
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Appendix 2 
Impact of LEED and Energy Star certification on rents (in dollars per sq.ft 
 
Dependent Variable: LOG(RENT) 
 
Method: Least Squares   
Included observations: 2613   
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
LEED 0.092 0.04 2.07 0.04 
ENERGY_STAR 0.116 0.02 5.32 0.00 
LOG(YEAR_TOTAL) 0.384 0.02 18.41 0.00 
LOG(PERCENT_LEASED) 0.019 0.01 1.69 0.09 
LOG(STORIES) 0.110 0.01 14.01 0.00 
LOG(LAND_AREA) -0.014 0.01 -2.02 0.04 
LOG(TYPICAL_FLOOR) -0.010 0.01 -0.94 0.35 
MARKET=ATLANTA -0.10 0.12 -0.84 0.40 
MARKET=AUSTIN -0.04 0.12 -0.33 0.74 
MARKET=BALTIMORE 0.19 0.11 1.73 0.08 
MARKET=BOSTON 0.17 0.12 1.36 0.18 
MARKET=CHARLOTTE -0.12 0.12 -0.98 0.33 
MARKET=CHICAGO -0.16 0.12 -1.32 0.19 
MARKET=CINCINNATI/DAYTON -0.56 0.13 -4.23 0.00 
MARKET=CLEVELAND -0.46 0.12 -3.80 0.00 
MARKET=COLORADO SPRINGS -0.49 0.12 -3.98 0.00 
MARKET=COLUMBUS -0.48 0.12 -3.93 0.00 
MARKET=DALLAS/FT WORTH -0.24 0.12 -2.07 0.04 
MARKET=DENVER -0.27 0.12 -2.26 0.02 
MARKET=DETROIT -0.35 0.16 -2.20 0.03 
MARKET=EAST BAY/OAKLAND 0.11 0.12 0.87 0.39 
MARKET=HARTFORD -0.09 0.12 -0.76 0.45 
MARKET=HAWAII -0.31 0.16 -1.90 0.06 
MARKET=HOUSTON -0.25 0.12 -2.10 0.04 
MARKET=INDIANAPOLIS 0.01 0.12 0.09 0.93 
MARKET=INLAND EMPIRE  0.05 0.13 0.36 0.72 
MARKET=JACKSONVILLE (FLORIDA) -0.25 0.12 -2.08 0.04 
MARKET=KANSAS CITY -0.46 0.13 -3.44 0.00 
MARKET=LAS VEGAS 0.46 0.11 4.02 0.00 
MARKET=LONG ISLAND (NEW YORK) 0.52 0.11 4.63 0.00 
MARKET=LOS ANGELES 0.38 0.12 3.24 0.00 
MARKET=LOUISVILLE -0.49 0.12 -4.22 0.00 
MARKET=MILWAUKEE/MADISON -0.43 0.13 -3.38 0.00 
MARKET=MINNEAPOLIS/ST PAUL -0.71 0.14 -5.25 0.00 
MARKET=NASHVILLE -0.42 0.12 -3.64 0.00 
MARKET=NEW ORLEANS -0.44 0.12 -3.79 0.00 
MARKET=NEW YORK CITY 0.71 0.12 5.70 0.00 
MARKET=NORTHERN NEW JERSEY 0.18 0.12 1.48 0.14 
MARKET=ORANGE (CALIFORNIA) 0.23 0.12 2.02 0.04 
MARKET=ORLANDO 0.04 0.12 0.35 0.72 
MARKET=PHILADELPHIA -0.13 0.12 -1.07 0.29 
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MARKET=PHOENIX 0.18 0.12 1.52 0.13 
MARKET=PORTLAND -0.10 0.12 -0.82 0.41 
MARKET=RICHMOND VA 0.47 0.11 4.18 0.00 
MARKET=ROANOKE 0.25 0.11 2.21 0.03 
MARKET=SACRAMENTO 0.25 0.12 2.04 0.04 
MARKET=SALT LAKE CITY -0.21 0.22 -0.99 0.32 
MARKET=SAN DIEGO 0.39 0.12 3.28 0.00 
MARKET=SAN FRANCISCO 0.38 0.12 3.21 0.00 
MARKET=SAVANNAH 0.58 0.11 5.12 0.00 
MARKET=SEATTLE/PUGET SOUND 0.12 0.12 0.97 0.33 
MARKET=SOUTH BAY/SAN JOSE 0.36 0.12 2.99 0.00 
MARKET=SOUTH FLORIDA 0.13 0.12 1.12 0.26 
MARKET=SPOKANE -1.00 0.11 -8.78 0.00 
MARKET=ST. LOUIS -0.18 0.14 -1.29 0.20 
MARKET=TAMPA/ST PETERSBURG -0.08 0.14 -0.58 0.57 
MARKET=WASHINGTON DC 0.33 0.12 2.83 0.00 
MARKET=WESTCHESTER -0.38 0.23 -1.69 0.09 
     
R-squared 0.55 Mean dep var 3.13 
Adjusted R-squared 0.54 S.D. dep var 0.45 
S.E. of regression 0.30 AIC 0.47 
Sum squared resid 235.05 Schwarz criterion 0.60 
Log likelihood -561.05 DW-stat 1.52 
 
Ramsey RESET Test: 
  
     
F-statistic 2.03     Prob. F(1,2554) 0.15 
Log likelihood ratio 2.08     Prob. Chi-Square(1) 0.15 
     
Wald Test: 
  
Equation: EQ_RENT_LEED  
    
Test Statistic Value   Df     Probability 
    
F-statistic 4.30 (1, 26)   0.04 
Chi-square 4.30 1   0.04 
    
    
Null Hypothesis Summary:  
    
Normalized Restriction (= 0) Value   Std. Err. 
    
C(1) 0.09 0.04 
    
 
White Heteroskedasticity Test: 
 
     
F-statistic 3.29 Prob. F(62,2550) 0.00 
Obs*R-squared 193.79 Prob. Chi-Square(62) 0.00 
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Appendix 3 
 
Impact of level of LEED certification on rents (in dollars per sq.ft.) 
 
Dependent Variable: LOG(RENT) 
 
Method: Least Squares   
Included observations: 2613   
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
LEEDLEVEL 0.03 0.02 1.92 0.05 
ENERGY_STAR 0.12 0.02 5.07 0.00 
LOG(YEAR_TOTAL) 0.38 0.03 12.29 0.00 
LOG(PERCENT_LEASED) 0.02 0.01 2.16 0.03 
LOG(STORIES) 0.11 0.01 14.46 0.00 
LOG(LAND_AREA) -0.01 0.01 -1.99 0.05 
LOG(TYPICAL_FLOOR) -0.01 0.01 -1.00 0.32 
MARKET=ATLANTA -0.09 0.22 -0.43 0.67 
MARKET=AUSTIN -0.03 0.22 -0.16 0.87 
MARKET=BALTIMORE 0.22 0.37 0.60 0.55 
MARKET=BOSTON 0.17 0.22 0.79 0.43 
MARKET=CHARLOTTE -0.11 0.22 -0.51 0.61 
MARKET=CHICAGO -0.15 0.22 -0.69 0.49 
MARKET=CINCINNATI/DAYTON -0.55 0.22 -2.48 0.01 
MARKET=CLEVELAND -0.46 0.22 -2.08 0.04 
MARKET=COLORADO SPRINGS -0.49 0.28 -1.75 0.08 
MARKET=COLUMBUS -0.47 0.22 -2.15 0.03 
MARKET=DALLAS/FT WORTH -0.24 0.22 -1.10 0.27 
MARKET=DENVER -0.26 0.22 -1.20 0.23 
MARKET=DETROIT -0.34 0.28 -1.23 0.22 
MARKET=EAST BAY/OAKLAND 0.11 0.22 0.50 0.62 
MARKET=HARTFORD -0.09 0.30 -0.29 0.77 
MARKET=HAWAII -0.31 0.28 -1.11 0.27 
MARKET=HOUSTON -0.24 0.22 -1.12 0.26 
MARKET=INDIANAPOLIS 0.02 0.37 0.04 0.97 
MARKET=INLAND EMPIRE  0.05 0.22 0.23 0.82 
MARKET=JACKSONVILLE (FLORIDA) -0.25 0.22 -1.10 0.27 
MARKET=KANSAS CITY -0.46 0.22 -2.04 0.04 
MARKET=LAS VEGAS 0.45 0.37 1.21 0.23 
MARKET=LONG ISLAND (NEW YORK) 0.59 0.37 1.58 0.11 
MARKET=LOS ANGELES 0.38 0.22 1.77 0.08 
MARKET=LOUISVILLE -0.48 0.37 -1.30 0.19 
MARKET=MILWAUKEE/MADISON -0.42 0.26 -1.59 0.11 
MARKET=MINNEAPOLIS/ST PAUL -0.71 0.23 -3.04 0.00 
MARKET=NASHVILLE -0.42 0.37 -1.12 0.26 
MARKET=NEW ORLEANS -0.44 0.37 -1.17 0.24 
MARKET=NEW YORK CITY 0.71 0.22 3.24 0.00 
MARKET=NORTHERN NEW JERSEY 0.18 0.22 0.82 0.41 
MARKET=ORANGE (CALIFORNIA) 0.24 0.22 1.10 0.27 
MARKET=ORLANDO 0.05 0.22 0.21 0.83 
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MARKET=PHILADELPHIA -0.12 0.22 -0.56 0.57 
MARKET=PHOENIX 0.18 0.22 0.84 0.40 
MARKET=PORTLAND -0.10 0.26 -0.37 0.71 
MARKET=RICHMOND VA 0.47 0.37 1.26 0.21 
MARKET=ROANOKE 0.31 0.37 0.84 0.40 
MARKET=SACRAMENTO 0.25 0.22 1.12 0.26 
MARKET=SALT LAKE CITY -0.19 0.28 -0.68 0.50 
MARKET=SAN DIEGO 0.39 0.22 1.80 0.07 
MARKET=SAN FRANCISCO 0.39 0.22 1.78 0.07 
MARKET=SAVANNAH 0.61 0.37 1.65 0.10 
MARKET=SEATTLE/PUGET SOUND 0.12 0.22 0.56 0.58 
MARKET=SOUTH BAY/SAN JOSE 0.36 0.22 1.65 0.10 
MARKET=SOUTH FLORIDA 0.14 0.22 0.63 0.53 
MARKET=SPOKANE -1.01 0.37 -2.70 0.01 
MARKET=ST. LOUIS -0.13 0.28 -0.48 0.63 
MARKET=TAMPA/ST PETERSBURG -0.08 0.30 -0.25 0.80 
MARKET=WASHINGTON DC 0.33 0.22 1.54 0.12 
MARKET=WESTCHESTER -0.38 0.30 -1.26 0.21 
    
R-squared 0.55 Mean dep var 3.13 
Adjusted R-squared 0.54 S.D. dep var 0.45 
S.E. of regression 0.30 AIC 0.47 
Sum squared resid 235.14 Schwarz criterion 0.60 
Log likelihood -561.54 DW-stat 1.52 
 
Ramsey RESET Test:   
     
F-statistic 2.05     Prob. F(1,2554) 0.15 
Log likelihood ratio 2.09     Prob. Chi-Square(1) 0.15 
     
 
Wald Test:   
Equation: EQ_RENT_LEEDLEVEL  
    
Test Statistic Value   df     Probability 
    
F-statistic 3.70 (1, 2555)   0.05 
Chi-square 3.70 1   0.05 
    
Normalized Restriction (= 0) Value   Std. Err. 
    
C(1) (Leed level) 0.034 0.018 
 
Heteroskedasticity Test: Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey 
     
     
F-statistic 20.23379     Prob. F(7,2882) 0.0000 
Obs*R-squared 135.3766     Prob. Chi-Square(7) 0.0000 
Scaled explained SS 273.9093     Prob. Chi-Square(7) 0.0000 
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Appendix 4 
 
Impact of certification on transaction prices (in dollars per sq.ft.)  
 
Dependent Variable: LOG(PRICESF)  
Method: Least Squares   
Sample: 1 4938 IF PRICESF>60 AND PRICESF<900  
Included observations: 2212   
          
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
          
     
GREEN 0.114 0.05 2.47 0.01 
LOG(PERCENT_LEASED) 0.043 0.02 2.87 0.00 
LOG(STORIES) 0.087 0.01 5.93 0.00 
LOG(LAND_AREA) 0.061 0.01 4.33 0.00 
LOG(TYPICAL_FLOOR) -0.126 0.02 -6.58 0.00 
LOG(YEAR_TOTAL) 2.275 1.31 1.73 0.08 
LOG(SALE_YEAR) -1.488 1.31 -1.14 0.26 
MARKET=AUSTIN 0.168 0.09 1.82 0.07 
MARKET=BOSTON 0.351 0.07 5.11 0.00 
MARKET=CHARLOTTE 0.192 0.08 2.26 0.02 
MARKET=CHICAGO 0.057 0.08 0.68 0.50 
MARKET=CINCINNATI -0.536 0.15 -3.70 0.00 
MARKET=CLEVELAND -0.474 0.11 -4.40 0.00 
MARKET=COLORADO 
SPR 
0.208 0.54 0.39 0.70 
MARKET=COLUMBUS -0.439 0.11 -4.04 0.00 
MARKET=DALLAS/FTW -0.177 0.10 -1.75 0.08 
MARKET=DENVER -0.188 0.08 -2.31 0.02 
MARKET=EAST 
BAY/OAKLAND 
0.243 0.10 2.38 0.02 
MARKET=HARTFORD 0.401 0.54 0.74 0.46 
MARKET=HOUSTON -0.248 0.11 -2.36 0.02 
MARKET=INDIANAPOLIS -0.301 0.38 -0.78 0.43 
MARKET=INLAND EMPIRE  -0.071 0.11 -0.64 0.52 
MARKET=J'VILLE (FL) -0.183 0.13 -1.36 0.18 
MARKET=KANSAS CITY -0.418 0.16 -2.60 0.01 
MARKET=LOS ANGELES 0.707 0.07 10.13 0.00 
MARKET=MARIN/SONOMA 0.811 0.54 1.50 0.13 
MARKET=MINNEAPOLIS 0.275 0.21 1.29 0.20 
MARKET=NEW ORLEANS 1.384 0.54 2.57 0.01 
MARKET=NEW YORK CITY 0.401 0.10 4.02 0.00 
MARKET=N NEW JERSEY 0.260 0.12 2.12 0.03 
MARKET=ORANGE (CAL) 0.367 0.07 5.28 0.00 
MARKET=ORLANDO 0.159 0.11 1.50 0.13 
MARKET=PHILADELPHIA -0.010 0.10 -0.10 0.92 
MARKET=PHOENIX 0.408 0.08 5.05 0.00 
MARKET=PORTLAND -0.064 0.32 -0.20 0.84 
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MARKET=SACRAMENTO 0.398 0.14 2.94 0.00 
MARKET=SALT LAKE CITY 1.461 0.54 2.71 0.01 
MARKET=SAN DIEGO 0.617 0.09 6.90 0.00 
MARKET=SAN 
FRANCISCO 
0.632 0.08 8.40 0.00 
MARKET=SEATTLE 0.502 0.08 6.26 0.00 
MARKET=S BAY/S JOSE 0.719 0.08 8.92 0.00 
MARKET=SOUTH 
FLORIDA 
0.357 0.08 4.74 0.00 
MARKET=ST. LOUIS -0.279 0.54 -0.52 0.61 
MARKET=TAMPA -0.596 0.54 -1.11 0.27 
MARKET=WASHINGTON 
DC 
0.580 0.07 7.76 0.00 
          
     
R-squared 0.301213     Mean dependent var 5.364223 
Adjusted R-squared 0.287025     S.D. dependent var 0.633698 
S.E. of regression 0.535081     Akaike info criterion 1.607335 
Sum squared resid 620.4367     Schwarz criterion 1.723327 
Log likelihood -1732.713     Durbin-Watson stat 0.767209 
          
 
Ramsey RESET Test:   
     
     
F-statistic 15.79022     Prob. F(1,2633) 0.0001 
Log likelihood ratio 16.01810     Prob. Chi-Square(1) 0.0001 
     
     
 
Wald Test:   
    
    
Test Statistic Value   df     Probability 
    
    
F-statistic 4.699037 (1, 2633)   0.0303 
Chi-square 4.699037 1   0.0302 
    
    
 
Heteroskedasticity Test: Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey 
     
     
F-statistic 134.2788     Prob. F(8,2670) 0.0000 
Obs*R-squared 768.6128     Prob. Chi-Square(8) 0.0000 
Scaled explained SS 12631.87     Prob. Chi-Square(8) 0.0000 
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Appendix 5 
 
Impact of Energy Star and LEED certification on transaction prices (in dollars per sq.ft.)  
 
Dependent Variable: LOG(PRICESF)  
Method: Least Squares   
Included observations: 2212   
          
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
          
     
ENERGY_STAR 0.103 0.05 2.21 0.03 
LEED 0.314 0.13 2.42 0.02 
LOG(PERCENT_LEASED) 0.045 0.02 2.96 0.00 
LOG(STORIES) 0.085 0.01 5.81 0.00 
LOG(LAND_AREA) 0.062 0.01 4.42 0.00 
LOG(TYPICAL_FLOOR) -0.128 0.02 -6.66 0.00 
LOG(YEAR_TOTAL) 2.164 1.31 1.65 0.10 
LOG(SALE_YEAR) -1.375 1.31 -1.05 0.29 
MARKET=AUSTIN 0.169 0.09 1.83 0.07 
MARKET=BOSTON 0.353 0.07 5.15 0.00 
MARKET=CHARLOTTE 0.192 0.08 2.26 0.02 
MARKET=CHICAGO 0.045 0.08 0.53 0.60 
MARKET=CINCINNATI -0.536 0.15 -3.70 0.00 
MARKET=CLEVELAND -0.475 0.11 -4.41 0.00 
MARKET=COLORADO 
SPR 
0.221 0.54 0.41 0.68 
MARKET=COLUMBUS -0.440 0.11 -4.05 0.00 
MARKET=DALLAS/FTW -0.177 0.10 -1.76 0.08 
MARKET=DENVER -0.192 0.08 -2.36 0.02 
MARKET=EAST 
BAY/OAKLAND 
0.246 0.10 2.40 0.02 
MARKET=HARTFORD 0.418 0.54 0.77 0.44 
MARKET=HOUSTON -0.242 0.11 -2.30 0.02 
MARKET=INDIANAPOLIS -0.303 0.38 -0.79 0.43 
MARKET=INLAND EMPIRE -0.072 0.11 -0.65 0.52 
MARKET=J'VILLE (FL) -0.184 0.13 -1.36 0.17 
MARKET=KANSAS CITY -0.442 0.16 -2.75 0.01 
MARKET=LOS ANGELES 0.707 0.07 10.13 0.00 
MARKET=MARIN/SONOMA 0.820 0.54 1.52 0.13 
MARKET=MINNEAPOLIS 0.290 0.21 1.36 0.17 
MARKET=NEW ORLEANS 1.400 0.54 2.60 0.01 
MARKET=NEW YORK CITY 0.402 0.10 4.04 0.00 
MARKET=N NEW JERSEY 0.262 0.12 2.14 0.03 
MARKET=ORANGE (CAL) 0.367 0.07 5.28 0.00 
MARKET=ORLANDO 0.159 0.11 1.49 0.14 
MARKET=PHILADELPHIA -0.015 0.10 -0.16 0.88 
MARKET=PHOENIX 0.411 0.08 5.08 0.00 
MARKET=PORTLAND -0.049 0.32 -0.16 0.88 
MARKET=SACRAMENTO 0.400 0.14 2.96 0.00 
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MARKET=SALT LAKE CITY 1.473 0.54 2.73 0.01 
MARKET=SAN DIEGO 0.615 0.09 6.88 0.00 
MARKET=SAN 
FRANCISCO 
0.632 0.08 8.40 0.00 
MARKET=SEATTLE 0.504 0.08 6.28 0.00 
MARKET=S BAY/S JOSE 0.719 0.08 8.92 0.00 
MARKET=SOUTH 
FLORIDA 
0.358 0.08 4.76 0.00 
MARKET=ST. LOUIS -0.473 0.55 -0.86 0.39 
MARKET=TAMPA -0.581 0.54 -1.08 0.28 
MARKET=WASHINGTON 
DC 
0.579 0.07 7.75 0.00 
          
     
R-squared 0.30     Mean dependent var 5.36 
Adjusted R-squared 0.29     S.D. dependent var 0.63 
S.E. of regression 0.53     Akaike info criterion 1.61 
Sum squared resid 619.17     Schwarz criterion 1.72 
Log likelihood -1730.45     Durbin-Watson stat 0.77 
          
 
Ramsey RESET Test:   
     
     
F-statistic 0.586696     Prob. F(1,2545) 0.4438 
Log likelihood ratio 0.597693     Prob. Chi-Square(1) 0.4395 
     
     
 
Wald Test:   
    
    
Test Statistic Value   df     Probability 
    
    
F-statistic 4.594999 (1, 2546)   0.0322 
Chi-square 4.594999 1   0.0321 
    
    
 
Heteroskedasticity Test: Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey 
     
     
F-statistic 3.708524     Prob. F(9,2583) 0.0001 
Obs*R-squared 33.07850     Prob. Chi-Square(9) 0.0001 
Scaled explained SS 38.09257     Prob. Chi-Square(9) 0.0000 
     
     
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
